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Abstract 
This article introduces the European Union Policy-Making (EUPOL) dataset. The 
dataset contains the complete records of the European Commission’s PreLex database, 
which tracks the interactions between the European institutions on legislative proposals 
and non-legislative policy documents over time. To be of maximum use to the research 
community, the dataset is both comprehensive and replicable. It relies on 2,600 
variables to describe the detailed event histories of more than 29,000 inter-institutional 
decision-making processes between 1975 and 2009. The data collection has been 
completely automated, enabling scholars to scrutinise and replicate the generation of the 
dataset. To illustrate the dataset’s general utility and discuss specific pitfalls, I present a 
descriptive analysis of the outcome and duration of Council decision-making. 
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The European Union policy-making dataset 
Recent years have seen a growing number of quantitative studies on European Union 
(EU) legislative politics, often basing their analysis at least partly on data gathered from 
the EU’s online databases. To give just a few examples, researchers have used this 
approach to study the selection of European Parliament (EP) rapporteurs (Høyland, 
2006; Kaeding, 2004), the vertical division of labour in the Council structure (Häge, 
2007, 2008), and the influence of the EP under the consultation procedure (Kardasheva, 
2009). Also, the efficiency of decision-making has received widespread attention 
(Golub, 1999, 2007; König, 2007; Schulz and König, 2000). Although these and other 
quantitative studies pursue very different research questions, they often have similar 
data requirements in that they take individual decision-making processes as their unit of 
analysis and rely on an overlapping set of independent and dependent variables. 
However, given the lack of a comprehensive, publicly accessible dataset, most 
researchers engage in their own data-collection efforts, which are usually tailored to 
meet the needs of their particular research question. The resulting datasets are thus of 
limited use beyond their initially intended purposes. This practice is not only onerous 
for individual researchers; the resulting duplication of work is also collectively 
inefficient for the research community.  
This article introduces the European Union Policy-Making (EUPOL) dataset. The 
dataset includes virtually all information contained in the European Commission’s 
online database PreLex.1 PreLex is maintained by the European Commission and its 
mission is to monitor the inter-institutional decision-making process. It tracks the 
progress of legislative proposals and other policy documents submitted by the 
Commission to the other EU institutions, providing detailed and comprehensive 
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information about various events and actors involved during all stages of the decision-
making process, as well as cross-references to documents contained in other online 
databases. In combination with its long-term coverage since the mid 1970s, PreLex is 
arguably the most useful online database for studies of EU politics. The EUPOL dataset 
provides the complete information contained in PreLex in a standardized and machine-
readable format. Overall, the dataset covers 29,366 decision-making processes, whose 
events and event features are described by 2,600 variables. Next to the replicability of 
the data collection process, ensuring the comprehensiveness of data coverage has been 
the main goal in the development of the dataset. The comprehensive inclusion of all 
available information ensures a maximally effective data provision by avoiding the need 
to duplicate data collection efforts. 
Developing such a comprehensive dataset is almost impossible without 
automating the data collection process. In the next section, I elaborate on the goal of 
developing a comprehensive and replicable dataset and the strategies used to achieve 
that goal. I give a brief overview of how the computer script extracts the information 
from PreLex and how it represents and saves that information in a format suitable for 
further statistical processing. Subsequently, I describe the features and coverage of 
EUPOL in more detail. A comparison with the EU-Lex dataset developed by König and 
colleagues (König et al., 2006a, 2006b) illustrates the respective strengths and 
weaknesses of the two datasets. The comparison will be helpful to researchers in 
identifying the dataset most suitable for their own purposes. While EUPOL’s major 
strength lies in its comprehensive coverage, it provides only the raw information given 
in PreLex. In most instances, additional data management and data manipulation will be 
required to generate and code substantively meaningful variables from that raw 
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information before the actual data analysis can proceed. To illustrate that process and to 
point to potential pitfalls, I describe the generation of variables for the type of legal act, 
the type of legislative procedure, and for the outcome and the duration of Council 
decision-making.2 
Finally, a descriptive and exploratory analysis of Council decision-making 
between 1976 and 2009 sheds new light on the outcome and the speed of negotiations 
between member states. With respect to the outcome of Council decision-making, the 
analysis shows that Council negotiations on legislative dossiers hardly fail. In about 
89% of all cases, negotiations conclude with the adoption of a Council decision. 
Regarding the process of decision-making, the typical duration of Council decision-
making on legislative dossiers has increased considerably over time and Council 
decision-making under procedures that grant the EP substantial law-making powers 
takes considerably longer than decision-making under the consultation procedure. While 
the associations of duration with the type of legislative procedure do not necessarily 
imply a causal connection between the two variables, they raise some interesting 
questions about the potential effect of EP empowerment that goes beyond the delay 
caused simply by the formal institutional requirement to reach agreement with an 
additional veto player. 
Replicability and comprehensiveness 
In the development of the dataset, I pursued two main goals: replicability and 
comprehensiveness. To be of general use to the research community, a dataset should 
contain all available information and it has to be clear how that information was 
collected. Researchers cannot rely on a dataset whose generation is not fully 
documented. The replication standard demands that sufficient information is provided 
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so that the results of an empirical study can at least in principle be reproduced (King, 
1995). While the provision of replication datasets on which the results of statistical 
analyses are based is becoming more and more common, the generation of these 
datasets themselves is still often insufficiently documented. The use of computer 
technology to generate datasets by extracting information from online databases 
provides unprecedented opportunities for a gap-less documentation of the research 
process, starting with the collection of the data and ending with the presentation of the 
results of the statistical analysis. In contrast to data collected and coded by humans, the 
automated extraction process is completely reliable and any repetition of the process in 
the future will result in exactly the same dataset. All that is required is that the original 
data sources are permanently stored and that the computer script used to extract the 
information is made publicly available. When generating the dataset, the proposal pages 
in PreLex were not just temporarily accessed to extract their informational content; their 
HTML source code was actually downloaded and locally stored to allow for subsequent 
replications of the data collection process. Furthermore, all software used during the 
data collection process is open source software and freely available on the web. Thus, 
the replication of the data collection process is not only possible in principle, but also 
made practically easy by the use of free and publicly available software tools.3  
At the same time, the reliability and replicability of the automated extraction 
process does not guarantee that the information is extracted correctly. The validity of 
the extracted information depends crucially on the way the computer scripts extract that 
information. Just like there are plenty of ways in which the formulation and structure of 
a questionnaire can bias measurement in survey research, there are plenty of ways in 
which errors in the way that online information is extracted by a computer script can 
5 
 
result in systematic distortions of the extracted information. Many political scientists 
might not be familiar with automated information extraction procedures and may find 
the description of those procedures rather technical. Yet they need to be documented 
transparently, just like any other data collection procedure, if we are to have any 
confidence in the validity of the generated data. Thus, the remainder of this section 
gives a brief overview of the download and extraction procedure and the supporting 
information (SI) in the online appendix (available at the website of this journal) 
provides more details.    
To guarantee the comprehensiveness of the dataset, the information extraction 
procedure builds the dataset from the bottom up. Crucially, the procedure does not 
require prior knowledge about the number and type of variables for which information 
should be extracted. Specifying all possible events and event characteristics contained in 
PreLex in advance is impossible. Therefore, only a flexible procedure that generates the 
variables and develops the structure of the dataset during the extraction process and in 
response to the extracted information can ensure complete coverage. The procedure 
proceeds in three steps, implemented in the form of three computer scripts written in the 
programming language Python. These scripts are run sequentially. The first script 
downloads the proposal pages of the PreLex database and saves their HTML source 
code in text files on the local hard drive. The PreLex database is continuously updated 
by Commission officials. Thus, saving and preserving the proposal pages in their 
current form ensures that the information extraction process can be replicated in the 
future even if the online database has been modified in the meantime. 
The second script extracts the information contained in the proposal page text files 
and temporarily stores it in a Python dictionary. The extraction script relies on the 
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structure of the HTML code to identify different decision-making events (e.g. 
‘Adoption by Commission’ or ‘First reading approval by Council’) and event 
characteristics (e.g. ‘Primary responsible’ or ‘Council agenda’; the first characteristic 
referring to the Directorate General [DG] of the Commission responsible for drafting 
the proposal, and the second to the type of item the proposal formed on the Council’s 
agenda). The script uses the abbreviated titles of these events and event characteristics 
to generate variable names and then extracts the information associated with those 
events and event characteristics to generate variable values. Because events can occur 
several times and because event characteristics can have several descriptors, the script 
adds a running number to each of them. For example, if both the event and the event 
characteristic occurred for the first time in the context of a specific proposal page, the 
event ‘Adoption by Commission’ results in the variable name ‘adopByComm_date_0’, 
with the corresponding variable value providing the date on which the College of 
Commissioners formally adopted the proposal; the associated event characteristic 
‘Primary responsible’ would result in the variable name 
‘adobByComm_0_primResp_0’, with the corresponding variable value providing the 
name of the Commission DG responsible for drafting the proposal. Finally, the third 
script writes the extracted information from the Python dictionary to a comma-separated 
text file. In the latter format, the data can then be imported into any statistical software 
package for further processing. 
Scope and content 
As mentioned above, a major goal in the generation of EUPOL was comprehensive 
coverage. As a result, the dataset contains all information contained in the PreLex 
database. Its 2,600 variables describe 29,366 decision-making processes relating to 
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legislative (e.g. directives, regulations, or decisions), non-legislative (e.g. working 
papers, communications, or reports), and budgetary proposals (e.g. transfer of 
appropriations) submitted by the Commission between 1975 and the end of 2009.4 The 
large number of variables is partly due to the fact that the same type of event (e.g. 
‘Discussion by Council’) can occur several times during the decision-making process, 
and that a single event descriptor (e.g. ‘Mandatory Consultation’) can refer to several 
characteristics (e.g. ‘European Parliament’ and ‘Economic and Social Committee’). 
While all variables present valuable information, it is noteworthy that they cover 680 
unique types of events and event descriptors (see the online appendix for a complete 
list).  
EUPOL’s comprehensive coverage distinguishes it from the EU-Lex dataset 
developed by König and colleagues (2006a, 2006b), but the latter has other advantages. 
To assist potential users in assessing the usefulness of the two datasets for their 
particular purposes, Table 1 summarizes their main characteristics. EU-Lex is a cross-
validated dataset relying on extracted information from two online databases, PreLex 
and CELEX. EU-Lex includes fully coded and labelled variables that can be directly 
used in a statistical analysis without much additional data processing. Furthermore, EU-
Lex allows leveraging the information from both datasets to reduce the number of 
missing values on particularly important institutional variables like the legislative 
procedure or the voting rule. The dataset includes 47 variables related to the following 
features of the legislative decision-making process (König et al., 2006a): the date of 
adoption of the proposal by the Commission, the dates of amendments made to the 
proposal by the Commission, the name of the responsible Commission DG, the date of 
the conclusion of the legislative process and the type of outcome (i.e. adoption, 
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withdrawal, rejection, or pending), the type of policy sector, the type of legislative act 
(i.e. directive, regulation, or decision), the type of voting rule in the Council, the type of 
legislative procedure, and the type of agenda-item at the last meeting of the Council (i.e. 
A-item, B-item, or written procedure). In instances where these variables are sufficient 
to investigate a research question, EU-Lex has obvious advantages. However, in 
instances where these variables are not sufficient and further information from PreLex is 
required, EUPOL is a useful alternative or at least a complementary source.5 
Table 1 Comparison of EU-Lex and EUPOL datasets 
 EU-Lex EUPOL 
Time period 1 Jan. 1984 - 1 Feb. 2003 ~1975 - 31 Dec. 2009 
No. of observations 8,475 29,366 
Total no. of variables 47 2,600 
Types of documents Decisions, Regulation, 
Directives 
Decisions, Regulations, 
Directives, Communications, 
Reports, Transfer of 
appropriations, Working 
papers, Opinions, Assent, 24 
other types of documents 
Types of variables Fully coded and labelled Raw information 
Data sources Celex and PreLex PreLex 
 
The information in EUPOL opens up a number of new research opportunities. First, the 
temporal coverage of EUPOL includes proposals introduced between 1975 and 2009, 
adding almost 15 years to the 1984 to 2003 coverage of EU-Lex and allowing us to 
track temporal changes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as in the more recent 
period after the entry into force of the Nice Treaty. Second, next to legislative dossiers, 
EUPOL covers all types of documents submitted by the Commission to the Council or 
the European Parliament and tracks their process over time. Scholars of agenda-setting 
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might find the information on non-binding policy documents most interesting, while 
students of budget politics might find the information on budgetary procedures 
especially useful. Third, EUPOL includes references to associated documents in the 
public registers of different institutions, the Official Journal of the EU, press releases, 
and other databases such as EUR-Lex (the successor of CELEX). For more recent years, 
these documents are often directly accessible online. Thus, the rather procedural 
information contained in EUPOL can easily be linked to information about the 
substance of decision-making derived from automated or manual content analyses of 
those documents.  
Most importantly, EUPOL provides more detailed information on individual 
events and event characteristics. Amongst other things, it describes all stages of the 
legislative decision-making process, not just its start- and end-points. To give a few 
examples, the information contained in EUPOL might be a useful resource for studies 
on the endogenous institutional choice of legislative procedures, on the influence of 
rapporteur characteristics on EP decision-making, and on the ministerial involvement in 
Council decision-making. Regarding the institutional choice of legislative procedure, 
EUPOL contains information about the legislative procedure under which the 
Commission originally submitted the proposal, any demands for changes in the 
procedure made by the Council or the EP, and the final procedure under which the 
proposal was eventually adopted. This information could be used to study the conditions 
under which disagreements form about the appropriate legislative procedure and why 
those disagreements are solved in favour of one or the other institutional actor (e.g. 
Jupille, 2004). EUPOL also contains the name of the EP rapporteur, a link to the 
document containing the rapporteur’s report, the date when the EP adopted its opinion, 
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and information on the type of outcome of the EP decision. Linking this information 
with information on the rapporteur’s party group affiliation and other personal attributes 
available from other datasets (e.g. Høyland et al., 2009), the effect of rapporteur 
characteristics on the efficiency and outcome of EP decision-making could be 
investigated. Finally, EUPOL can also be used to shed more light on the ministerial 
involvement in Council decision-making (e.g. Häge, 2007). The dataset includes 
information on all Council meetings at which a formal decision has been taken, 
including the session number, the Council configuration, links to relevant Council 
documents, and most importantly, the type of item the proposal formed on the 
ministers’ agenda. To assess the questions of whether or not and how often ministers are 
directly involved in Council decision-making, we need to examine all meetings during 
the entire legislative process, not only the meeting at the end of the process. EUPOL 
provides that kind of information. 
While EUPOL does not consist of readily coded variables and requires additional 
data manipulation in a statistics programme, it makes the data collection step of the 
research process obsolete. Most quantitative political science researchers will have the 
basic data management skills necessary to generate substantively meaningful variables 
from the information contained in EUPOL, while few will have the skills to programme 
their own extraction procedure. Ideally, we would like to have a comprehensive dataset 
that consists of a set of fully coded and documented variables. However, a combination 
of the enormous amount of information available in PreLex and the idiosyncratic 
information needs of researchers make the generation of such a dataset practically 
impossible. Thus, a second best solution is to provide the complete raw information, 
which omits the need for data collection while allowing researchers to construct 
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variables tailored to their own specific research needs. The EUPOL dataset contains the 
information from the PreLex database in a comma-separated text file. This observation-
by-variable format can easily be read by any statistical software package. In the 
following, I first depict the contents of EUPOL and then present a descriptive analysis 
of the outcome and duration of Council decision-making. In the process, I discuss 
problematic issues related to the selection of appropriate cases and to the generation of 
substantively meaningful variables. As the next section will show, many of these data 
management tasks involve more or less contestable decisions about how best to restrict 
the temporal and policy domain of the study sample, and how to code and combine 
information from EUPOL to generate the variables of interest for the analysis. The 
many uncertainties involved in making these data management decisions illustrate why 
it is important to provide access to the full raw information contained in PreLex. 
Researchers can easily check whether alternative coding options make a difference and 
construct variables in a way that makes most sense in light of their own research 
questions.6 
EU policy-making: A quantitative assessment 
The dataset contains information on a large number of legislative, non-legislative, and 
budgetary documents, the overwhelming majority of which has been submitted by the 
European Commission. Figure 1 presents an overview. Not surprisingly, legislative 
proposals are amongst the most frequent types of files. The dataset includes 8,994 
proposals for regulations, accounting for roughly 31% of all proposals. Proposals for 
decisions follow suit with a frequency of 5,850 (20%). The dataset also includes 1,990 
(7%) proposals for directives and 294 (1%) requests for Council assent. Among the 
non-legislative documents, communications (4,082; 14%) and reports (3,441; 12%) are 
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the most common, followed by working papers (1,363; 5%) and proposals for opinions 
(349; 1%). Finally, transfer of appropriations is the most frequent budgetary document 
(1,498; 5%). The ‘other’ category includes the 24 remaining types of files, each 
individually accounting for less than 1% and collectively for less than 4% of all 
documents (see Table SI-1 for more details).  
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Figure 1 Number of documents by type of file 
Note: The ‘other’ category includes 24 types of documents, each individually accounting for less than 1% 
of the total number of proposals (N = 28,846). See Table SI-1 in the online appendix for the detailed 
statistics underlying this figure. 
The categorical ‘Type of file’ variable used to generate Figure 1 is primarily based on 
information from the type of file descriptor of the ‘Adoption by Commission’ event 
(27,667; 95%). Where such information was not available, I replaced the missing values 
with information from the ‘Transmission to Council’ event (1,425; 5%). Yet before 
merging the information of the two event variables into a single type of file variable, 
their descriptor values needed to be recoded. Often, several slightly different descriptor 
values are used to refer to the same event characteristic. For example, the descriptor 
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values ‘regulation’, ‘proposal for a regulation’, recommendation for a regulation’, and 
‘draft regulation’ all refer to a proposal for a regulation and had to be recoded to reflect 
this fact. Similar corrections had to be made to almost all type of file descriptors. 
Indeed, such inconsistent usage of descriptor values is quite common in PreLex. Finally, 
after identifying the start date of the policy process by merging the information from the 
‘Adoption by Commission’ date with the ‘Transmission to Council’ date in a manner 
similar to the type of file information, I left-censored the dataset. While the dataset 
includes a large number of proposals that started in 1975, some indications exist that the 
coverage for 1975 is not quite complete. Especially the number of documents submitted 
during the first half of 1975 seems to be unusually low compared to the following years. 
Also, years before 1975 are clearly not systematically covered (see also endnote 4 on 
this point). Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, I excluded all cases that were 
introduced before 1976. This selection reduces the number of observations from 29,367 
to 28,846. 
Figure 2 presents another set of statistics of interest to scholars and practitioners 
of EU legislative politics: the number of legislative proposals submitted under different 
legislative procedures. Interestingly, only 9,303 (32%) out of 28,846 PreLex documents 
were examined under a legislative procedure (see Table SI-2.2). Of those 8,198 
proposals, 6,166 (66%) were processed through the consultation procedure, 1,170 
(13%) through the agreement procedure, 1,112 (12%) through the codecision procedure, 
580 (6%) through the cooperation procedure, and 251 (3%) through the assent 
procedure. The ‘other’ category includes 24 cases processed through four very rarely 
used procedures (see Table SI-2.1 for details).  
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Figure 2 Number of proposals by type of legislative procedures 
Note: The figure plots the number of proposals with legislative procedures (N = 9,303), which constitute 
about 32% of the proposals in the dataset (total N = 28,846). The ‘other’ category includes ‘Consultation 
European Central Bank’, ‘Consultation Court of Auditors’, ‘Social protocol’, and ‘Special legislative 
procedure (EP consent required)’. Each of those categories accounts for less than 1% of all legislative 
procedures. See Table SI-2.1 in the online appendix for the detailed statistics underlying this figure. 
For generating the procedure variable underlying Figure 2, I relied primarily on the 
procedure information given by the ‘Adoption by Commission’ event. When that 
information was missing, I fell back on the procedure information provided by the 
‘Transmission to Council’ event or the header of the proposal pages. However, this 
strategy resulted in only 195 additional changes. Another way to find out about the 
involvement of the EP is to check each case for the occurrence of an ‘EP single reading’ 
or an ‘EP first reading’ event, the former signalling that the proposal was a consultation 
file and the latter that the proposal was either a cooperation or codecision file. 
Cooperation and codecision files can then be distinguished by how they were eventually 
adopted. The cooperation procedure usually ends through a ‘Formal adoption by 
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Council’ event, while the codecision procedure usually ends through a ‘Signature by EP 
and Council’ event. Overall, this recoding procedure resulted in 1,328 additional 
consultation cases and 10 additional cooperation cases. 
Finally, I also corrected some obvious errors in the variable’s values. Several 
proposals indicated a type of legislative procedure that did not exist at the time the 
decision-making process had started. I recoded all codecision and cooperation 
procedure files to consultation procedure files if they were introduced before the Single 
European Act came into force in July 1987, and all codecision procedure files to 
cooperation procedure files if they were introduced before the Treaty of Maastricht 
came into force in November 1993. These inconsistencies probably occurred because 
the proposals’ legal basis changed sometime during the decision-making process and 
the corresponding information was ‘updated’ after the fact. However, since the current 
analysis is interested in the type of procedure at the start of the decision-making 
process, these changes are required. 
The preceding discussion exposes a weakness of the PreLex database. When a 
certain descriptor is missing, it is often hard to ascertain whether that descriptor is 
missing because it is not applicable to the case at hand or because of an oversight when 
Commission staff entered the information into PreLex. The best that can be done is to 
utilize all relevant information contained in a proposal page to check and, if appropriate, 
to adjust the coding of the variable in question. Another weakness of PreLex is the 
inconsistent usage and uneven coverage of events and event characteristics. In this case, 
missing information is not due to a mistake when entering the information, but due to 
systematic differences in the inclusion and coding of different events and event 
descriptors. While the current analysis is not directly affected by this problem, much 
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interesting information in PreLex is only available for certain time periods. For 
example, information about the field of activity is only available before the year 2005, 
and information about Commission DGs associated with (rather than being responsible 
for) drafting the proposal is only available before 2001. On the other hand, information 
about meetings in which the Council discussed but did not decide on a proposal is only 
available since mid-2000. Thus, the fact that a certain variable exists in the dataset does 
not imply that it includes information for the entire time period. Any analysis using 
parts of the data must be preceded by a systematic examination of missing values on the 
relevant variables.7 
With these caveats in mind, Figures 3 and 4 present the changes in the volume of 
non-legislative documents and legislative proposals over time. Figure 3 shows the 
yearly number of communications, reports, and working papers submitted by the 
Commission between 1976 and 2009. The number of communications shows a clearly 
increasing trend over time, with a minimum number of 51 in 1976 and a maximum 
number of 230 in 2007. The number of reports first steadily increased as well, from a 
minimum of 21 in 1978 to a maximum of 167 in 2000, but subsequently dropped to 92 
in 2005. Only recent years have seen a resurge to 150 reports in 2009. Before 1996, 
PreLex records 27 working papers in total, indicating that this type of documents was 
not systematically covered during that period of time. Starting in 1996, the number of 
working papers remained relatively stable, fluctuating around a mean of 95 with a 
standard deviation of 13, reaching a minimum of 70 in 2003 and a maximum of 123 in 
the subsequent year. 
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Figure 3 Number of non-legislative documents by type of file, 1976-2009 
Note: The figure shows changes over time in the volume of the three most common non-legislative types 
of documents: communications, reports, and working papers (N = 8,886; 31% of all documents in 
dataset). The yearly number of working papers is essentially zero before 1996, which indicates that this 
type of document had previously not been documented in the database. See Table SI-3 in the online 
appendix for the detailed statistics underlying this figure. 
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Figure 4 Number of legislative proposals by type of file, 1976-2009 
Note: The figure shows changes over time in the volume of legislative proposals for decisions, 
regulations, and directives (N = 7,858; 27% of all documents in dataset). Note that these figures exclude 
decisions, regulations, and directives that were not adopted through the consultation, cooperation, or 
codecision procedure. See Table SI-4 in the online appendix for the detailed statistics underlying this 
figure. 
Figure 4 shows the yearly number of proposals for regulations, decisions, and directives 
during the study period. This figure and the remainder of the analysis in this section are 
based on legislative proposals submitted under the consultation, cooperation, or 
codecision procedure. This selection further reduces the sample from 9,303 to 7,858 
proposals. The number of proposals for regulations shows a negative trend over time, 
reaching a high of 198 proposals in 1977 and falling to its current minimum value of 64 
in 2009. Only the late eighties and early nineties saw somewhat of a reversal of this 
trend, with the number of proposals for regulations briefly reaching a peak of 208 in 
1990. In contrast to the number of proposals for regulations, the number of proposals 
for decisions actually increased over time; from its minimum number of 16 in 1976 to 
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its current number of 53 in 2009, with a maximum of 111 proposals in 1998. Finally, 
the number of proposals for directives shows no trend in either direction, varying 
around a mean of 54 proposals with a standard deviation of 15 proposals. The directives 
time-series reached its maximum value of 88 proposals in 1988 and its minimum value 
of 23 proposals in 2009. Interestingly, the latter value indicates a huge reduction after 
the second-highest value of 82 proposals in 2008. In contrast to the visible increase in 
the number of non-legislative documents, no clear-cut trend exists in the supply of 
legislative proposals. The number of regulations decreased, the number of decisions 
increased, and the number of directives remained largely the same, although with large 
fluctuations around its time-average (the changes over time of the latter two instruments 
are better visible when the time-series are plotted individually, see Figures SI-4.1 and 
SI-4.2). 
Figure 5 looks at changes over time in the procedures through which the 
legislative proposals have been considered. By far the largest number of proposals used 
to be submitted under the consultation procedure, with a maximum number of 283 in 
1977. The Single European Act introduced the cooperation procedure in July 1987. The 
number of proposals examined under this procedure quickly rose to a peak of 95 in 
1990. In November 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the codecision procedure, 
replacing the cooperation procedure in many policy areas. A corresponding substitution 
effect is clearly visible in Figure 5, with the decline in cooperation files from 71 in 1992 
to 36 in 1995 being roughly similar in magnitude to the rise in codecision files from 0 in 
1992 to 30 in 1995.  
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Figure 5 Number of legislative proposals by type of procedure, 1976-2009 
Note: The figure shows changes over time in the volume of legislative proposals submitted under the 
consultation, cooperation, and codecision procedure (N = 7,858; 27% of all proposals in dataset). See 
Table SI-5 in the online appendix for the detailed statistics underlying this figure. 
Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in November 1999, almost 
completely replaced the cooperation procedure by the codecision procedure and also 
expanded the latter’s applicability to areas previously governed by the consultation 
procedure. As a result, the number of proposals considered under the cooperation 
procedure dropped to zero in 2000 and remained there for most of the remaining time 
period. The only exception was the year 2005, in which a single proposal was examined 
under this procedure. In contrast, the number of codecision files rose steadily to its 
maximum number of 114 in 2008. In this year, the number of codecision files for the 
first time surpassed the number of consultation files. The year 2009 saw a strong 
reduction in the number of legislative proposals in general, but the drop in codecision 
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files was larger than the drop in consultation files. Whether this reduction indicates the 
start of a negative trend or represents only a once-off fluctuation remains to be seen. 
The outcome and duration of Council decision-making 
In order to give the reader an impression of the breadth of EUPOL’s coverage, the 
figures in the previous section shed light on the supply of proposals and the legislative 
procedures through which those proposals were processed. This section illustrates 
EUPOL’s added value by examining a topic that has not received much attention in the 
quantitative literature on EU politics so far: the outcome and duration of Council 
decision-making.8 By Council decision-making, I refer to the first formal decision of the 
Council during the legislative procedure. In the case of consultation, this coincides with 
the adoption of the legislative act. In case of procedures that grant additional powers to 
the EP, this usually refers to the adoption of the Council’s common position. In the 
remaining stages of those procedures, this common position then acts as the collective 
bargaining position of the Council in negotiations with the EP. Thus, the negotiations 
among member states in the Council largely take place during the first reading stage; the 
latter stages of the procedure are mostly concerned with finding a compromise with the 
Parliament (e.g. Bostock, 2002: 219-222).  
Figure 6 plots the relative frequency of different types of Council decision-
making outcomes. More precisely, the figure distinguishes between the adoption, the 
partial adoption (which implies the partial withdrawal or partial replacement), the 
withdrawal, and the replacement of the proposal. It also indicates the proportion of 
proposals that are still pending. Proposals have been coded as having been adopted by 
the Council if there was a ‘Formal adoption by Council’ (under the consultation 
procedure), a ‘Council approval 1st reading’ (under the codecision procedure), or a 
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‘Adoption common position’ event (under the cooperation or codecision procedure). In 
the absence of all of these events, the proposal has been coded as partially adopted if 
there was a ‘Partial adoption by Council’ event, as withdrawn if there was a 
‘Withdrawal by Commission’ event, and as replaced if there was a ‘Replacement’ event. 
Proposals that indicated none of those events either were treated as still pending.  
The figure displays a very large success rate of Council negotiations on legislative 
dossiers. Note that the success of Council negotiations does not only refer to an 
agreement amongst member states, but also to an agreement between member states and 
the Commission. The Commission attends all Council meetings and can withdraw its 
proposal at any stage of the process before the Council has adopted a formal decision. 
Thus, the adoption of a formal Council decision also implies that the Commission has 
not objected to that decision. The fact that most withdrawals occur in groups at periodic 
intervals indicates that withdrawals are due to gridlock amongst member states rather 
than disagreements with the Commission. However, in general, the withdrawal by the 
Commission might reflect either a blockage in the Council or a genuine objection by the 
Commission. 
Figure 6 shows that many of the proposals introduced during the last two years of 
the study period are still pending. However, looking at the period up to and including 
the year 2007, the Council and EP adopted 89.2% of all proposals completely and 0.4% 
partially. Only 8.1% were withdrawn and 0.6% replaced by the Commission, and still 
1.8% had not been concluded yet (see Table SI-6.3). During that period, the lowest 
success rate of 82.8% was reached in 1981, and the highest success rate of 94.3% in 
2000. The figure indicates that the success rate might have increased somewhat in the 
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long term, but if at all, this tendency is quite weak compared to short- and medium-term 
fluctuations.  
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Figure 6 Outcome of Council decision-making by start year, 1976-2009 
Note: The figure shows the percentage of legislative proposals that were adopted by the Council, partially 
adopted by the Council, withdrawn by the Commission, replaced by the Commission, and that are still 
pending. Council adoption includes the formal adoption of the act under the consultation procedure, the 
approval at first reading under the codecision procedure, and the adoption of a common position under the 
codecision or cooperation procedure. Legislative proposals refer to proposals for directives, regulations, 
and decisions submitted under the consultation, cooperation, or codecision procedure (N = 7,858). See 
Table SI-6.1 in the online appendix for the detailed statistics underlying this figure. Table SI-6.2 provides 
the absolute frequencies. 
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Relying on the same event information from PreLex as for the construction of the type 
of decision-making outcome variable, I constructed a variable indicating the end-date of 
the Council decision-making process. In cases where the same type of event occurred 
several times, I used the date of the last event as the end-date. The reasoning behind this 
coding choice is that Council decision-making cannot have been completed if there 
were further adoption events at later points in time. Subtracting the start-date from the 
end-date variable yielded a variable indicating the duration of Council decision-making. 
Unfortunately, proposals that fail to be adopted are often not immediately withdrawn by 
the Commission but left dormant until a general review of pending proposals at a later 
date finds that they are no longer topical. Thus, the withdrawal date in PreLex will often 
not closely correspond to the date of the actual failure of the proposal in the decision-
making process. While decision-making processes that ended with a withdrawn 
proposal might be expected to be somewhat longer than those that ended with an 
adopted proposal, the data suggest that the median duration for processes that ended 
with a withdrawn proposal is about eight times longer than the median duration for 
processes that ended with the adoption of the proposal (see Figure SI-7.1). Such a large 
difference seems rather implausible.  
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Figure 7 Duration of Council decision-making by start year, 1976-2007 
Note: The figure shows box-plots of the distribution of the duration in days of Council decision-making 
on legislative dossiers, conditioned by the year in which the proposal was submitted. The figure is based 
on proposals that have been adopted or partially adopted (N = 6,720; 89.6% of all legislative dossiers [N = 
7,503] submitted during that time period). Proposals that the Commission has withdrawn or replaced are 
not included (N = 648; 8.6%); neither are proposals that were still pending at the time of the data 
extraction in April 2010 (N = 135; 1.8%). Many of the conditional distributions include a number of 
extreme outliers that are larger than the adjacent value used to determine the end of the right whisker. 
These outside values have been omitted from the box-plots to increase the readability of the graph. See 
Figure SI-7.3 in the online appendix for a graph including the outside values and Table SI-7 for the 
detailed statistics underlying Figure 7. 
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Thus, Figure 7 plots only the duration of Council decision-making for proposals that 
have actually been adopted, completely or partially. Even with the restriction to adopted 
proposals, the duration variable is extremely right-skewed (see Figure SI-7.2). To 
enhance readability, Figure 7 does not show a number of extremely large values lying 
outside the range of the box plot’s whiskers (see Figure SI-7.3 for a plot including the 
outside values). Because of the large proportion of still pending proposals that were 
introduced during 2008 and 2009, I restrict the further analysis to proposals introduced 
by the end of 2007. While Figure 7 shows a consistently large variability in duration 
values between 1976 and 2007, it also indicates that the typical duration of Council 
decision-making, in the form of its median value, has considerably increased over time.  
Figure 8 illustrates this change in the median duration of Council decision-making 
more clearly. Over the entire time period studied, the median duration of Council 
decision-making more than doubled, from 145 days in 1976 to 303.5 days in 2007. Its 
maximum value of 430 days was reached in 2006, the second-last year of the study 
period. To make it easier to distinguish the short- to medium-term fluctuations from 
long-term developments, the observed medians are overlaid with a median spline scatter 
plot smoother. The scatter plot smoother indicates that the increase in duration did not 
occur in the form of a constant trend over time. Despite some large fluctuations, the 
median duration stayed relatively stable during the late seventies and throughout the 
eighties. In fact, the year 1987 had the lowest median duration of just 125 days. Much 
of the growth in the duration of Council decision-making only started in the early to 
mid-nineties and gained renewed impetus around the turn of the millennium. 
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Figure 8 Median duration of Council decision-making by start year, 1976-2007 
Note: The figure plots the median duration of Council decision-making by start year over time. The curve 
is a median splines scatter plot smoother. For further information about the sample, see note to Figure 7. 
Figure 9 gives an indication of the relative contribution to this increase in the aggregate 
duration of Council decision-making by files examined under different legislative 
procedures. The dashed line in the figure represents the aggregate median duration of all 
files. The aggregate duration is compared to the duration of subsets of files decided 
according to the consultation, cooperation, and codecision procedure, respectively. 
Again, it has to be stressed that the duration under the latter two procedures refers to the 
Council’s first reading decision, not to the procedure as a whole.  
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Figure 9 Median duration of Council decision-making under different legislative 
procedures, 1976-2007 
Note: The figure compares the median duration of Council decision-making under different procedures 
(solid lines with different marker symbols) with the aggregate median duration across all procedures 
(dashed line). Note that the extremely high median value for the codecision procedure in 1993 is based on 
only 8 cases. For further information about the sample, see note to Figure 7. 
The duration of Council decision-making under the cooperation and codecision 
procedure does not indicate a clear trend over time in either direction. In a comparative 
perspective, Council decision-making under procedures with EP involvement takes 
consistently longer than under the consultation procedure, contributing to a consistently 
larger aggregate duration since the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987. 
Yet this contribution remains largely constant for most of the time period. In contrast to 
procedures that grant more substantial powers to the EP, the duration of files decided 
under the consultation procedure has been generally on the rise since around 1993. With 
the exception of the years 2004 and 2005, which also saw a large jump in the duration 
of codecision files, much of the increase in the aggregate duration seems to mirror this 
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increase in the duration of consultation files. To be very clear, the associations of the 
level of and the change in the duration of Council decision-making with the type of 
procedure do not necessarily imply the existence of causal relationships. Indeed, as the 
institutional rules governing interactions under the consultation procedure did not 
experience any change over time, the increase in Council decision-making duration 
under this procedure cannot possibly be causally related to features of the procedure 
itself. However, these associations raise a number of interesting questions for further 
research that will be discussed in the concluding section. 
Conclusion 
This article introduces the EU Policy-Making (EUPOL) dataset. The dataset includes 
virtually all information contained in the Commission’s online database PreLex, which 
monitors the inter-institutional decision-making process of the EU. Next to the 
replicability of the data collection process, comprehensive coverage was a major goal in 
the development of the dataset. Only a comprehensive and transparently generated 
dataset can provide maximum value to the research community. In line with the goal of 
transparency, the paper first described the automated generation of the dataset, 
including the download of the relevant PreLex proposal pages, the information 
extraction process, and the storage of the final dataset. Each of these steps can be 
fraught with error, so it is important to explicate them. The second section discussed the 
content of the dataset and its possible uses in more detail, arguing that the new 
information provided by EUPOL will be useful for studying a wide variety of questions 
interesting to students of EU politics.  
The EUPOL dataset is not an off-the-shelf dataset ready to use. It provides the 
raw information as recorded in PreLex. Further data processing will often be required to 
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transform that information into substantively interesting variables suitable for a 
statistical analysis. Nevertheless, EUPOL offers the potential to remove the rather 
resource-consuming data collection step from the research process of quantitative 
analysts wanting to use information from PreLex. Given substantive knowledge about 
EU politics and basic data management skills, meaningful variables can be computed 
from the information contained in EUPOL with relative ease. To illustrate this process, 
the third and fourth sections of the paper presented not only descriptive statistics of the 
content of EUPOL and examined some basic features of Council decision-making, they 
also described how the relevant variables were generated from the raw data. 
To demonstrate the usefulness of the detailed event information contained in 
EUPOL, I examined the outcome and duration of Council decision-making. The 
description of the type of decision-making outcome highlighted the high success rate of 
Council negotiations. Overall, the Council was able to reach an agreement on about 
89% of all legislative proposals submitted by the Commission between 1976 and 2007. 
Council negotiations failed in less than ten percent of all cases. The analysis of the time 
it takes the Council to reach its first formal decision in the legislative procedure 
revealed a substantial increase in duration over time, starting in the early to mid-
nineties. While Council decision-making under the codecision and cooperation 
procedure takes consistently longer than under the consultation procedure, the increase 
over time in the aggregate median duration of Council decision-making seems to be 
mainly related to factors increasing the length of Council decision-making under the 
consultation procedure. The median duration of Council decision-making under the 
codecision procedure only showed a marked increase in the years 2004 and 2005.  
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These patterns raise a number of questions: First, why would the Council need 
more time to reach a decision under the codecision or cooperation procedure than under 
the consultation procedure? Despite the recent increase in so-called ‘early agreements’, 
the EP did not directly engage in negotiations with the Council during the first reading 
stage of those procedures for much of the time period studied. Thus, the need to 
negotiate a compromise with the EP cannot be directly responsible for the consistently 
longer duration of Council decision-making under procedures with EP involvement. Is 
the longer duration an indirect result of a more subtle feature of those procedures (e.g. 
differences in political and public scrutiny; see Häge, 2011) or is it caused by an 
underlying third factor that is associated with both the type of procedure and Council 
decision-making duration (e.g. differences in the salience of policy issues)?  
Another interesting point relates to the differential development of decision-
making duration over time. Why has the duration of Council decision-making increased 
under the consultation procedure but generally not under the cooperation and codecision 
procedure? Obviously, the increase under consultation cannot simply be due to features 
of the procedure itself, because they remained constant over time. Yet many temporally 
changing factors, like the increasing number of member states through successive 
enlargements, should have had a similar effect on Council decision-making regardless 
of the procedure. The differential pattern in the temporal development raises questions 
about the extent to which Council decision-making speed is governed by a homogenous 
set of causal forces that combine in an additive manner. Maybe some temporally 
changing factors influence only certain types of procedures? At the very least, the 
differential pattern points to the possibility of interaction effects between temporal 
changes and features directly or indirectly related to the type of procedure. Clearly, 
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without a more systematic study of the potential causes, we can only speculate about the 
relevant factors. This short exploratory study thus raises more questions than it can 
possibly answer. However, at the same time, it illustrates the potential of EUPOL to 
create novel factual insights and generate a host of opportunities for future research. 
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Notes 
1 PreLex can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en (2 July 2010).  
2 The figures and tables based on those variables provide basic but surprisingly hard-to-come-
by statistics (e.g. for teaching purposes) about important features of EU policy-making. The 
paper includes only the figures, but the corresponding tables are printed in the supporting 
information in the online appendix and can be downloaded as Excel files from my website 
(www.frankhaege.eu). 
3 The PreLex HTML files, the extracted dataset, and the Python download, extraction, and 
storage scripts are available for download at www.frankhaege.eu. The download and 
extraction scripts were written in Python 2.6.5, using ActiveState’s PythonWin editor 
(http://www.activestate.com/activepython/downloads [2 July 2010]). The scripts relied on 
the following external Python modules:  
 BeautifulSoup (http://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/ [accessed 2 July 2010]), 
 ClientForm (http://wwwsearch.sourceforge.net/old/ClientForm/ [accessed 2 July 2010]),  
 Mechanize (http://wwwsearch.sourceforge.net/mechanize/ [accessed 2 July 2010]).  
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4 The exact starting date for the coverage of PreLex is unknown; the database includes a few 
proposals that were submitted before January 1975, but there is a very clear jump in the 
number of proposals at that point in time. In the past, the online documentation of PreLex 
stated that the database is complete as of 1976 (see also König et al., 2006b: 556), so this 
year might be a more conservative cut-off point than 1975 for using the data in an analysis. 
The HTML file download was conducted on 8 and 9 April 2010. While the download did not 
include proposals introduced later than 31 December 2009, the downloaded files include 
information on the progress of proposals introduced before that date until the download date 
in April 2010. 
5  The two datasets can easily be merged to enjoy the best of both worlds. 
6 The data management and analysis for this part of the paper was conducted in R 2.10.1 (R 
Development Core Team, 2009) and Stata/SE 11.1 (StataCorp, 2009). All datasets, the R-
script, and the Stata do-files are available at www.frankhaege.eu. 
7  I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for reminding me of this important point. 
8  A partial exception is the study by Toshkov and Rasmussen (2010), which relies on data 
derived from the EP’s legislative observatory database. Their study’s substantial and 
temporal scope is narrower in that it focuses exclusively on first reading decisions under the 
codecision procedure during the time period from 1997 to 2009. 
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